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INTRODUCTION 
Recent decades have seen an explosion of interest in legal realism and me-
diation. At first glance, they appear not to have much to do with each other, 
with legal realism being a theory of jurisprudence and mediation being a form 
of alternative dispute resolution. In fact, however, they are closely aligned. 
The realist movement flowered in the early 1930s1 and its continuing pow-
er has led scholars in recent years to herald the coming of a “new legal real-
ism.”2 Realism developed a range of insights that reject the idea of law as an 
exercise in logic.3 Realism holds that legal analysis and logic are ex post facto 
justifications for conclusions already arrived at.4 From a realist perspective, 
judges reach decisions through subconscious motivations, whether based on 
politics, psychology, or individual experience.5 Realists also argue that law 
arises in social and individual contexts in a particular way—a granular view fo-
cused on how law affects actual human beings.6 
Mediation has similarly generated an exhaustive literature of increasing 
volume and complexity.7 Mediation is profoundly different from adjudication. 
1  Marcus J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in Realist 
Jurisprudence, Note, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 157, 157–58 (2015). 
2  The amount of this new literature is massive. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY (2007); Tracey E. George, et al., The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 689, 691 (2011); Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a 
New Legal Realism, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237, 237 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008); Victoria Nourse & 
Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 64 (2009) (“over 300 papers have cited the term 
‘new legal realism’ ”); Edmund Ursin, Clarifying the Normative Dimension of Legal Real-
ism: The Example of Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 487, 490 (2012). 
The use of the term “New Legal Realism” originates with David M. Trubek’s article Com-
plexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social 
Thought about Law, 11 LAW & SOC. REV. 527, 543–44 (1977) (calling for “new realism” 
within legal studies). For an account of themes underlying New Legal Realism, see infra text 
accompanying notes 76–88. 
3  See infra text accompanying notes 28, 39–51. 
4  See infra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
5  See infra text accompanying notes 28, 91–109. 
6  For a good example, see George, et al., supra note 2, at 716, which examines how judicial 
opinions arise from and influence people “on-the-ground” in interesting, if not surprising, 
ways. 
7  The field continues to mature, and now includes four law school journals dedicated solely 
to alternative dispute resolution: the Cardozo Journal of Dispute Resolution, Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, and the Jour-
nal of Dispute Resolution published by the University of Missouri School of Law. An im-
portant non-law school publication is Conflict Resolution Quarterly, which publishes pre-
dominantly empirical work from a social science perspective. Moreover, “classics” on 
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One fundamental difference is that it shifts the focus of decision-making from 
judges to the disputants themselves.8 Disputants exchange perspectives and de-
velop their own norms—whether “legal” or not—to form the basis for settle-
ment. As a result, there is no need to conduct legal analysis, or to apply facts to 
law, or for judges to reach “right” results. Mediation enables disputants to en-
gage in ways of resolution of their own choosing.9 
 Mediation thus represents realism in action. Both focus on the specifics of 
what happens “on the ground.”10 Both have a long history of interdisciplinary 
research.11 Both focus on the limitations and uncertainties—if not dangers—of 
adjudication.12 However, while realism has successfully developed a powerful 
critique, the realists have had difficulty crafting an affirmative program that re-
solves the issues their critique identifies.13 In many ways, mediation is that af-
firmative program. 
This Article, then, explores how mediation provides insights about how to 
respond to the enduring challenges realism first posed over eighty years ago. 
The Article does so in four sections. The first two sections describe the founda-
tions of realism and mediation. The third section traces how mediation furnish-
es ways to answer the realist critique. The final section identifies areas where 
mediation does not provide all the answers to realism. The most important of 
these is ameliorating challenges low-income disputants face when engaged in 
mediation. 
I. REALISM
A. The Realist Challenge
Realism is a crucial—some have said the most important—movement in
conceptions of law in the last century.14 A challenge, however, is to define real-
ism in narrow enough terms to make it meaningful. References to “realism” 
may embody whatever is viewed as necessary to approach law “realistically.”15 
This is too diffuse to be helpful, and circular as well: what is real depends on 
conflict resolution have emerged.  For two examples, see Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orien-
tations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 
(1996). 
8  See infra text accompanying notes 147–57, 163–66. 
9  See infra text accompanying notes 158–66. 
10  See infra text accompanying notes 193–200. 
11  See infra text accompanying notes 218–23. 
12  See infra text accompanying notes 212–17. 
13  See infra text accompanying notes 83–111. 
14  LEITER, supra note 2, at 1 (“American Legal Realism was, quite justifiably, the major in-
tellectual event in 20th century American legal practice and scholarship”). For a collection of 
seminal writings from the realist school, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher 
III et al. eds., 1993). 
15  See infra text accompanying notes 77–82. 
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conceptions of what law “really” is, and such conceptions may be ideas that the 
original realists strenuously argued against. 
Moreover, some critique the term “realism” because it suggests a unity of 
ideas among a designated set of realists that did not exist,16 or an unwarranted 
degree of novelty because that realist ideas were novel when, in fact, similar 
ideas were percolating in the nineteenth century.17 While important, these de-
bates are not necessary to address here: there is meaningful consensus about 
realism is, and, with that in mind, the following offers an overview of realism 
both in its original incarnation and in the work of “new legal realists” whose 
work builds upon ideas of the first realists.18 
B. The “Original Realists”
Oliver Wendell Holmes has been acknowledged as the originator of real-
ism.19 His groundbreaking 1897 article The Path of the Law20 was particularly 
influential.21 Some forty years later, in the 1930s, a group of other scholars—
what this Article calls the “original realists”—elaborated on Holmes’s ideas. 
While, as noted, not all realists were of one mind,22 realism, at its core, was 
a reaction against “formalism”23—the idea that law is a set of rules that, 
through a correct application of logic, lead to precise and certain results.24 The 
following summarizes main themes expressed by the realists beginning with 
Holmes. 
16  Karl Llewellyn—one of the original realists—made this point as early as 1931. Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1222, 1256 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism] (realists do not have a “group phi-
losophy or program”). 
17  Brian Z. Tamanaha has made these points in detail. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Legal Real-
ism in Context, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM 147, 147 (Elizabeth Mertz et al. eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Tamanaha, Legal Realism in Context]; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Le-
gal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 734 (2009) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Understanding]; Ta-
manaha, however, does not dispute the importance of ideas associated with the realists, but, 
rather, the identification of realism as an independent source of these insights. 
18  For an overview of a chronology of these movements, see ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM TO CRITICAL THEORY (2d ed. 2005). 
19  Id. at 91. 
20  O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
21  For an anthology of Holmes’s writings, see THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES (Richard A. Posner 
ed. 1992). 
22  See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 1254 (arguing that realism does not constitute one 
“school” of thought). Brian Z. Tamanaha goes further, decrying “gerrymandering” by schol-
ars who cherry-pick ideas from different realists to support the scholars’ favored interpreta-
tion of what realism is. See Tamanaha, Legal Realism in Context, supra note 17, at 161. 
23  While “formalism” is the most common term, other synonyms include “fundamentalism” 
or “absolutism.” JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 61–62 (Transaction Publish-
ers 2009) (1930). 
24  BROOKS, supra note 18, at 40–59 (summarizing formalism). 
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1. Holmes’s Critique
There is no exaggerating the importance of Oliver Wendell Holmes as the 
source of realism.25 Subsequent realists openly acknowledged this debt in terms 
approaching the hagiographic.26 
The Path of the Law captures the essence of his critique and, by extension, 
of realism more generally. The following is an oft-cited27 section from that arti-
cle: 
The language of the judicial decision is mainly the language of logic . . . [b]ut 
certainty generally is illusion . . . Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to 
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an in-
articulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve 
of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form . . . [Such 
a conclusion, however,] is because of some belief as to the practice of the com-
munity or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, be-
cause of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative 
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclu-
sions. . . . [I]f the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider . . . the so-
cial advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they some-
times would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that they were 
taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.28 
 Holmes’s points here—that logic is a fallacy, that unconscious assumptions 
generate decisions, that certainty is an illusion—are core insights of realism. 
25  Laura Kalman, for example, notes how realists “elaborated upon Holmes more than they 
led the way.” LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960, at 17 (1986). See also
BROOKS, supra note 18, at 91 (describing Holmes as the “‘father’ of legal realism”). 
Holmes’s importance and reputation remain extraordinarily high. Richard A. Posner, Intro-
duction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 21, at ix (describing Holmes as “the most il-
lustrious figure in the history of American Law” and “a major figure in American intellectual 
and cultural history generally”). Although Holmes was still alive at the beginning of the 
flowering of realism, he was near the end of a long life (he died in 1935 at 95) and did not 
appear to comment on the work of the far younger scholars who were so influenced by him. 
26  Jerome Frank, for example, was quite explicit in this regard, and even wrote the final 
chapter of his leading text as an homage to Holmes and titled it “Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, the Completely Adult Jurist.” FRANK, supra note 23, at 253–60. 
27  See Holmes, supra note 20. 
28  Id. at 465–68. Holmes reiterated his rejection of logical form by writing that “[t]he felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have 
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) 
(1881). 
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2. The “Original Realists”
Primarily in the 1930s,29 a group of legal scholars—collectively known as 
“realists”—built upon Holmes’s original critique.30 Karl Llewellyn31 and Felix 
Cohen32 were prominent realists.33 The realist most often cited as presenting 
realism in its “pure” (if not most radical) form was Jerome Frank, particularly 
in his book Law and the Modern Mind published in 1930.34 
These writers, among others, were both enormously influential and enor-
mously controversial, with their influence spreading into legal scholarship,35 
law teaching,36 and even statutory drafting, including the Uniform Commercial 
Code.37  
The original realists were fervent in their beliefs. Consider the following 
manifesto by Karl Llewellyn that explicitly recalls the opening verses of the 
Gospel of John: 
Ferment is abroad in the law. The sphere of interest widens; men become inter-
ested again in the life that swirls around things legal. Before rules, were facts; in 
the beginning was not a Word, but a Doing. Behind decisions stand judges; 
judges are men; as men they have human backgrounds. Beyond rules, again, lie 
29  Some have noted that the rise of realism coincides with the growth of the New Deal. See 
Curtis, supra note 1. This historical context is important to understand, but beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
30  For a collection of writing from the original realists, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, su-
pra note 14. 
31  For two important articles by Llewellyn about realism, see Llewellyn, Some Realism, su-
pra note 16; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence]. For a discussion of 
Llewellyn’s influence, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT (1973). 
32  For Cohen’s most famous work, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). For an intellectual biography of Co-
hen, see DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING 
OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007). 
33  Other influential realists were Morris R. Cohen, Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, Max 
Radin, and Fred Rodell. The writings of all three, among others, are included in the leading 
anthology of the realist literature. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 14. 
34  FRANK, supra note 23. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this book at the 
time of its publication and thereafter. One scholar described appearance of the book as if it 
“fell like a bomb on the legal world.” Charles E. Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66 YALE L.J. 817, 
817 (1957). Laura Kalman took the explosion metaphor a step further by describing the book 
as “an intellectual atomic bomb” that left “few . . . untouched.” KALMAN, supra note 25, at 8. 
35   See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 14. 
36  Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 909–10 
(1933). 
37  Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They 
Used to Be”, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 370 (noting how Karl Llewellyn added a realist cast to 
the drafting of the UCC). 
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effects: beyond decisions stand people whom rules and decisions directly or in-
directly touch.38 
Albeit in sweeping language, Llewellyn suggests a number of related ideas 
that characterize realism. The first is a critique of “logic” and the supposed 
strict adherence to rules that goes along with it. The realists held that judges ac-
tually manipulate “law”—whether statutes or opinions—in any way they chose 
to lead to a result that, for non-legal reasons, they want to reach.39 Felix Cohen 
presented this critique by imagining a formalist “heaven” that contains a 
dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an indefinite number 
of meanings out of any text or statute, an apparatus for constructing fictions, and 
a hair-splitting machine that could divide a single hair into 999,999 equal parts 
and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could split each of these parts 
again into 999,999 equal parts.40 
The image of the “dialectic-hydraulic-interpretive press” illustrates how, 
through manipulation, any decision can be presented in logical form.41 Judges 
manipulate legal texts at will and thereby justify a conclusion rather than 
demonstrate how the conclusion was actually reached.42 
A second and related idea identifies the actual bases upon which judges 
reach conclusions. Holmes saw these influences as “some belief as to the prac-
tice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy.”43 
Cohen saw judicial decisions as “an intersection of social forces.”44 Frank re-
ferred to “multitudinous and complicated” factors that arise from judges’ “pe-
culiarly individual traits.”45 Note that the realists, or at least the most radical of 
38  Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 16, at 1222 (1931). The biblical verse that Llewel-
lyn echoes is as follows: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through 
him; and without him was not anything made that hath been made.” 1 John 1:1–3 (American 
Standard). 
39  Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 34–35 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (application of precedent does 
not “logically compel[]” a given result). 
40  Cohen, supra note 32, at 809. Others employ different images to express the idea of for-
malism-as-machine. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 462 (1995) (referring to judicial analysis as a “phonograph 
. . . through which the preexisting legal principles are given expression”) (quoting Robert 
Eugene Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 
MICH. L. REV. 737, 744 (1922)). 
41  See Holmes, supra note 20, at 465–70. 
42  See Holmes, supra note 20, at 465–70. Frank called this “the dominance of the conclu-
sion.” FRANK, supra note 23, at 109. 
43  See Holmes, supra note 20, at 466. See also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 
341–42 (2001) (“experience” includes “everything that arises out of the interaction of the 
human organism with its environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies, preju-
dices”). 
44  Cohen, supra note 32, at 843. 
45  FRANK, supra note 23, at 112–15. Frank also extended this criticism to jury verdicts. Id. at 
183–99. 
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them, argued that these influences were not mere biases, but the only possible 
bases for a judicial decision.46 
A third idea is that judges do not themselves recognize how logic is an illu-
sion. They have convinced themselves that they really do follow rules that lead 
to “right” results.47 This illusion originates from a “longing for certainty”48 
which leads, in turn, to what Frank characterized as “Peter Pan legends of a ju-
ristic happy hunting ground in a land of legal absolutes.”49 Thus, the real bases 
for decisions go unrecognized—a situation Frank called “self-delusion” 50 or, 
more evocatively, “judicial somnambulism.”51  
A fourth theme is a call for greater focus on how law affects actual people. 
There are two elements to this critique. One is the impact that judicial decision-
making has on individual cases.52 For example, Llewellyn identified the con-
tingencies that determine whether a litigant can recover for a claim for breach 
of contract: 
[I]f the other party does not perform as agreed, you can sue, and if you have a
fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong with your witnesses or the jury, and you
give up four or five days of time and some ten to thirty percent of the proceeds,
and wait two to twenty months, you will probably get a judgment for a sum con-
siderably less than what the performance would have been worth—which, if the
other party is solvent and has not secreted his assets, you can in further due
course collect with six percent interest for delay.53
The other element is outside individual lawsuits. For example, Felix Cohen 
noted that “beyond the [judicial] decision are human activities affected by 
it”54—the social consequences that go beyond individual cases. 
 A final theme emphasizes the importance of particularity.55 Realists had lit-
tle use for generalities. Rather, they attacked those who conceived law as ab-
46  Id. at 114; Holmes, supra note 20, at 465–66. 
47  Frank called this “rule fetichism [sic].” FRANK, supra note 23, at xiii. 
48  Holmes, supra note 20, at 465–66. 
49  FRANK, supra note 23, at 260. 
50  FRANK, supra note 23, at 167. 
51  FRANK, supra note 23, at 159. Some trivialize realism as saying no more than “what the 
judge had for breakfast” generates decisions. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 36 (1986). It 
is unclear, however, whether some realists would take offense at the intended insult, particu-
larly since the point captures the idea that high-minded formalism ignores circumstances 
that, in a real way, affect judges in their day to day lives. Indeed, Frank came reasonably 
close to the “breakfast” idea as an accurate reflection of the realist critique. See FRANK, su-
pra note 23, at 147 (“judicial discretion . . . may be . . . controlled by the merest trifles such 
as the toothache, the rheumatism, the gout, or a fit of indigestion, or even through the very 
means by which indigestion is frequently sought to be avoided.”). 
52  See Cohen, supra note 32, at 843; Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 31, at 
437–38. 
53  Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 31, at 437–38. 
54  Cohen, supra note 32, at 843. 
55  FRANK, supra note 23, at 61. 
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stract, disembodied, and sterile.56 Realists instead often suggested that the way 
to understand law was through the examination of outside legal sources. Felix 
Cohen identified anthropology, religion, political science, and economics as 
possibilities.57 Frank drew extensively upon psychology, particularly the work 
of Sigmund Freud and Jean Piaget.58 There are many other examples.59 
 All of these aspects of realism, among others, were radical indeed, and 
continue to be, as one commentator has put it, “corrosive.”60 To view realism as 
merely a call for “judicial activism” or to base decisions on “public policy” 
minimizes how subversive it is. Rather, realists would say that all judicial deci-
sions are really the result of assumptions that a judge is not aware of. 61 
C. The “New” Legal Realism
The cataclysm of World War II, among other things,62 ended the original
era of realism. Its impact has endured, however: some have argued that virtual-
ly all subsequent legal theory can be understood as a reaction to it.63 That said, 
56  Virtually all of LAW AND THE MODERN MIND can be seen in this light. A good example is 
Frank’s critique of Joseph Henry Beale, a Harvard professor whom the realists saw as the 
very model of a misled formalist. FRANK, supra note 23, at 53–61, 203. 
57  Cohen, supra note 32, at 830–33. 
58  FRANK, supra note 23, at 75–99. Frank relied particularly on Sigmund Freud, devoting an 
early chapter to describe how law acts as a “father substitute” with a religious dimension. Id. 
at 14–23, 192, 210–18. It is difficult for a modern reader to take these ideas seriously, and 
some have suggested this has contributed to the relative lack of recognition of the im-
portance of the book in recent years. See Brian H. Bix, Introduction, in LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND xv (1930) (Frank’s “attempt to incorporate psychoanalytic theory into a legal 
realist jurisprudence” is “what now seems strangest and least persuasive” about the book). 
59  For a discussion of how realists drew upon social science, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM,
supra note 14, at 232–36. 
60  Mensch, supra note 39, at 35. Mensch argues that post-realist theorists must grapple with 
the realist critique without the benefit of the “naive [sic] confidence of the past” Id. at 36. 
61  Some trace the origin of the idea of “public policy” to the ancient distinction between 
“law” and “equity,” with equity—what is now called “public policy”—acting as a check 
when law would lead to unjust or unfair consequences. BROOKS, supra note 18, at 6–12. The 
distinction, however, collapses when viewed through the lens of realism: “objective” appli-
cation of either law or equity is driven by cognition unknown to the judge. Another way of 
looking at this is through the longstanding debate about the value of equity itself. One cri-
tique of equity is that it is necessarily arbitrary—what seventeenth-century legal philosopher 
John Selden called the equivalent of whether a judge “has a long foot, another a short foot.” 
Id. at 7. A realist might well agree, but would say that the metaphor applies equally to appli-
cation of “law.” 
62  Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and 
the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 330 (1995). 
63  Mensch, supra note 39, at 35 (“[s]ince the realists, American jurists have dedicated them-
selves to the task of reconstruction”). 
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in some incarnations its influence is subtler—a kind of realism lite, with its 
rougher, more radical edges smoothed out.64 
Not always, however. Realism’s radical spirit burst forth in the Critical Le-
gal Studies movement65 until that movement fell out of favor in relatively short 
order.66 More enduring are a cluster of critical movements focused on disem-
powered groups: people of color (Critical Race Theory),67 women (Feminist 
Jurisprudence),68 LGBTQ persons (“Queer Theory”),69 Latinos (“Lat Crits”),70 
socioeconomics (“Critical Class Theory Movement” or “Class Crits”),71 and, of 
particular currency, the impact of multiple identities (intersectionality).72 These 
movements often analyze how purported legal “neutrality” masks and facili-
tates discrimination and subordination—a project that is very much in the real-
ist vein.73 Indeed, Derrick Bell—a founder of Critical Race Theory—was ex-
plicit about this.74 
64  Michal Alberstein, The Jurisprudence of Mediation: Between Formalism, Feminism and 
Identity Conversations, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 11 (2009) (noting that “the real-
ist critique was domesticated”). 
65  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 
563–64 (1983). For a comparison between realism and Critical Legal Studies that focuses on 
the differences between the two, see WOUTER DE BEEN, LEGAL REALISM REGAINED: SAVING 
REALISM FROM CRITICAL ACCLAIM 1 (2008). 
66  After the Critical Legal Studies “burst upon . . . the scene” in the 1970s, it went into “deep 
decline.” Robert C. Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to Litowitz, 15 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 333, 340 (2003).
67  See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 2017); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
68  See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER LAW AND POLICY 1 (2d ed. 2014); 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle S. 
Jacobs eds., 2003); Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist Legal Theory’s 
Role in New Legal Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405. 
69  See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy: Liber-
alism Meets Queer Theory, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271 (2001). 
70  See, e.g., THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 1998); Robert Westley, Lat Crit Theory and the Problematics of Inter-
nal/External Oppression: A Comparison of Forms of Oppression and Inter-
Group/IntraGroup Solidarity, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (1999). 
71  See Justin Desautels-Stein et al., Classcrits Mission Statement, 43 SW. L. REV. 651 (2014). 
72  For a classic examination of intersectionality, seePeggy McIntosh, White Privilege and 
Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in 
Women’s Studies, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER, supra note 
68, at 63. See also Theresa Glennon, The Developmental Perspective and Intersectionality, 
88 TEMP. L. REV. 929 (2016). 
73  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992) (noting how 
“abstract principles lead to legal results that harm blacks and perpetuate their inferior status” 
and “mask policy choices and value judgments”); For the realist critique of “logic,” see su-
pra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
74  See Bell, supra note 73, at 363–64 (drawing connections between legal realism and law 
reform on behalf of African-Americans). 
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Moreover, in the last twenty years or so, many scholars self-identify as 
“new legal realists.” The amount of this literature is enormous—as of 2009 
“over 300 papers have cited the term ‘new legal realism.’ ” 75 Prominent schol-
ars such as Cass Sunstein,76 Frederick Schauer,77 and Daniel A. Farber78 have 
written on the topic. The new legal realists are not of one mind, although they 
do draw upon discernable ideas from the original realists.79 Often their goal is 
to examine how law affects real people, often by drawing upon social science.80 
As one commentator has put it, new legal realists “make another attempt at the 
original legal realist agenda of getting formal law and the ‘real world’ . . . into 
conversation with one another.”81 
In an effort to understand the different areas and methodologies upon 
which new legal realists draw, Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer have 
grouped  “new realists” into three categories each of which, in turn, includes 
different emphases and variations.82 The first group—the “behaviorists”—
focuses on how behavioral economics and judicial attitudes based on ideology 
or political affiliation drive judicial decisions.83 This group also explores how 
cognitive biases can impede rationality.84 The second group—the “contextual-
ists”—examine “law in action” by investigating behavior in the real world.85 
The third group—the “institutionalists”— examines the complex ways that in-
stitutions, such as government, business norms, and private interests, interact.86 
Nourse and Shaffer’s work illustrates the vitality of legal realism as framing 
current critical approaches to law.87 
75  Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 64. 
76  Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 831–33. 
77  Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749 (2013). 
78  Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001) (book re-
view). 
79  The degree to which the new realist movement owes its methodology and goals to the 
original realists is contested, but there is no doubt that the original realists remain, at a mini-
mum, an important influence. William Twining, Regal R/realism and Jurisprudence: Ten 
Theses, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, supra note 17, at 128–29 (noting how in terms of the 
relationship between new legal realists and original realists, “[t]here may be some actual 
continuities and some unfinished agenda, as well as some false claims to ancestry”). 
80  Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction: New Legal Realism: Law and Social Science in the New 
Millennium, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, supra note 17, at 2 (new legal realists seek to 
move the “discussion envisioned by the original Realists forward into the new millennium”). 
81  Id. at 3. 
82  Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 62. For a summary of Nourse and Shaffer’s categories, 
see Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Le-
gal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555, 562 (2010). 
83  Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 2, at 77–78. 
84  Id. at 77. 
85  Id. at 79. 
86  Id. at 85–90. 
87  See Suchman & Mertz, supra note 82, at 557 (noting how the range of new legal realism 
“trace their intellectual pedigrees back to the original Legal Realist movement of the 
1930s”). 
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D. The Continuing Challenge for Old and New Realism: What To Do?
Realism thus was and continues to be a rich source for thinking about law
from multiple perspectives. While some academics, judges, and lawyers con-
tinue to frame legal analysis as formalist, there is a wide recognition that this  is 
a guise. As one commentator has noted: 
Since the realists, American jurists have dedicated themselves to the task of re-
construction . . . After realism, American legal theorists had, as it were, eaten of 
the tree of knowledge, and there could be no return to the naive confidence of 
the past.88 
 If the realist critique was a success, however, it was far less successful in 
proposing affirmative programs that would rectify the problems it identified. 89 
This is not to say there were not attempts: there were, but they were not particu-
larly effective.90 
 One response drew upon psychology. Holmes argued that judges should re-
ject the illusion of certainty and bring to consciousness motivations that actual-
ly generate their decisions.91 Building on this idea, Jerome Frank suggested that 
a judge should be “well trained . . . in the best available methods of psycholo-
gy”92 in order to “observe their own mental processes.”93 This would involve 
judges 
scruti[nizing] . . . his own personality so that he might become keenly aware of 
his own prejudices, biases, antipathies, and the like, not only in connection with 
attitudes political, economic and moral but with respect to more minute and less 
easily discoverable preferences and disinclinations.94 
Frank argued that this is the “best we can hope for.”95 
However, Frank’s suggestion generates difficulties. The study of psycholo-
gy does not necessarily lead to awareness of one’s “own personality.” Psycho-
therapy might perhaps do so, but mandating this for judges is, to put it mildly, 
unlikely. Another perhaps deeper objection is that biases are endemic to human 
cognition,96 and to somehow bring “biases” to the forefront of consciousness 
88  Mensch, supra note 39, at 34–35. A well-known exception is Antonin Scalia. A full dis-
cussion of Scalia’s theories of interpretation is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it 
to say what has been called his “textualism” is more nuanced than he is often given credit 
for. BROOKS, supra note 18, at 63–74 (describing the difference between Scalia’s “textual-
ism” and formalism). 
89  Mensch, supra note 39, at 35–36 (realism “was so corrosive that many of the most influ-
ential realists evaded the full implications of their own criticism”); see also AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 14, at 165–71. 
90  Mensch, supra note 39, at 35–36. 
91  Holmes, supra note 20, at 466–67. 
92  FRANK, supra note 23, at 158 n.27. 
93  Id. at 163. 
94  Id at 158 n. 27. Frank sometimes lapsed into a spiritual mode. He said, for example, that 
what is required is “an enlightened state of awareness of . . . unawareness.” Id. at 164. 
95  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
96  Id. 
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simplifies a complex process that is not so easy, or even possible, to move be-
yond.97 This is not to say that the study of psychology and cognitive science has 
no value at all: it does, and important work has drawn upon it to great effect.98 
Nevertheless, it is far from the full answer that Frank so confidently asserts. 
 Another idea is to redress what realists decried as the isolation of judges 
from the real world—something that Jerome Frank called the “occupational 
disease” of “appellate-court-itis.”99 One possibility is to have judges better un-
derstand the experience of others through reading or through personal observa-
tions. Holmes recounted a conversation he had with Louis Brandeis that illus-
trates this point. Brandeis suggested that Holmes study “some domain of 
fact”100 by actually visiting the “textile industries” in Lawrence, Massachusetts 
to “get a human notion of how it really is.”101 Brandeis’s choice of Lawrence 
was not arbitrary. It had a largely female, poor, immigrant population who 
worked in textile factories and was the location of a notable strike in 1912.102 
Lawrence was hardly the Massachusetts that Holmes—a privileged member of 
one of the most prominent families in Boston—knew.103 
Other more recent suggestions about the value of gaining experience out-
side of one’s social milieu have arisen in critical theory literature and else-
where.104 Judge Alex Kozinski has argued that judges should witness an execu-
97  One overview of social science literature compiled a “partial list” of forty-two different 
cognitive biases. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of Pa-
ternalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 951 (citing Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, 
Towards a Balanced Social Psychology: Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-
Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 313, 317 tbl.1 
(2004)). For an overview of biases and the challenges in overcoming them in the context of 
lawyering and mediation, see Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers’ 
Judgment: Is Mediation Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
98  For examples, see JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND 
DECISION MAKING (2012). 
99  FRANK, supra note 23, at xli. 
100  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, 1874–1932, 13–14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
101  Id. 
102  The strike is known as the “Bread and Roses Strike.” See WILLIAM CAHN, LAWRENCE
1912: THE BREAD AND ROSES STRIKE (1980); 4 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 306–28 (1965). The event “became a nearly legendary 
part of national political life . . . .” Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Dem-
ocratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 697 n.51 (1985). The conditions in the factories in Law-
rence had long been notorious. The collapse of a roof due to a fire 1860 led to the death of 
hundreds of workers. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Diary of George Templeton Strong, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1546, 1547 (1953) (book review). 
103  Posner, supra note 25, at ix. 
104  Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1987) (judges should “study[] . . . the 
actual experience of black poverty and listen[] to those who have done so.”). 
14 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1 
tion before deciding death penalty cases105 or wear make-up before deciding 
whether mandatory grooming guidelines for women are discriminatory.106 Jus-
tice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court went to court in cas-
ual clothes to learn about the experience.107 Some scholars have recommended 
broadening experience less directly by reading “outsider” narratives as a means 
to avoid “serious moral error.”108 
These solutions can perhaps be helpful. Reading, traveling, and seeking out 
broader life experience can be eye-opening and, at times, life-changing. Never-
theless, no travel itinerary or reading list could begin to address the multiplicity 
of social and individual contexts that come before a judge, and arguing that it 
would vastly simplifies the complexity and particularity of individual experi-
ence.109 
Another potential solution involves interdisciplinary research. A founda-
tion of realism is to assess law in the context of other disciplines.110 New legal 
realists continue this project.111 Particularly compelling examples are among 
those engaged in Critical Race Theory and Feminist Jurisprudence, both of 
105  See Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 1997, at 52 (wondering 
how he “with cool precision, cast votes and write opinions that seal another human being’s 
fate but lack the courage to witness the consequences of my actions.”). 
106  Judge Kozinski, in a gender discrimination case regarding mandatory grooming require-
ments for women in a Nevada Casino, imagined a situation where there is “a rule that all 
judges wear face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick while on the bench.” Jespersen v. Har-
rah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006). 
107  Justice Abrahamson observed trial court proceedings and was treated rudely by attorneys 
and court personnel. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 497–98 (1984). 
108  Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious 
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929–32, 1934, 1936–38, 1945–46 (1991) (suggesting 
that if judges read narratives about, for example, Japanese culture and slavery they might 
have avoided notorious opinions like Koramatsu and Plessy). 
109  The increasingly influential idea of “intersectionality” holds that an individual may iden-
tify as constituted by multiple identities, such as race, gender, socioeconomic status, and 
sexual orientation. See generally Glennon, supra note 72, at 931. 
110  Cohen, supra note 32, at 834 (“legal science necessarily involves us in psychology, eco-
nomics, and political theory.”). 
111  Frank himself had an opportunity to put his realism into practice while serving as judge 
for the Second Circuit from 1941 to 1957. A good example of his judicial approach is his 
lengthy concurrence in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801–27 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, 
J., concurring), an obscenity case later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Frank’s concurrence was accompanied by a lengthy appendix 
which reflects strains of realism by discussing the history, psychology, philosophy, and liter-
ature of censorship. Roth, 237 F.2d at 805–27. Most notably he addresses “[h]ow censorship 
under the statute actually operates,” which includes how judges, prosecutors, jurors, and 
public opinion act “as censors.” Id. at 820–24. At the same time, the opinion includes con-
ventional legal analysis, including of precedent—a process he decried in LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND. FRANK, supra note 23, at 136–38 (calling an opinion an “essay” subject to 
multiple interpretations). Judge Frank thus employed a hybrid of conventional analysis and 
realism in his Roth concurrence. 
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which draw extensively on history, sociology, psychology, and economics112—
attempting to translate “social knowledge into policy and action.”113 This effort 
has borne fruit in crafting law reform efforts, sometimes with success.114 Judges 
will also on occasion employ this approach. A good example is Stephen Brey-
er’s dissent in District of Columbia v. Heller, in which he offers a detailed de-
scription of social science data that addresses the impact of gun violence in ur-
ban communities.115 
 It would be preposterous to dismiss this wealth of work by lawyers, schol-
ars, and judges who incorporate social science as failures. There are, however, 
inherent limitations faced by this approach. It is seductive for legal scholars to 
plug social science into legal issues. This offers a veneer of being interdiscipli-
nary, with a risk of simplifying, if not outright distorting, the distinct goals and 
methodologies of social science research.116 
 A related issue is that social scientists, whether engaged in quantitative or 
qualitative work, do not claim to have reached definitive conclusions. Indeed, a 
fundamental element of research design is to qualify conclusions and identify 
fruitful areas for additional investigation.117 These caveats tend to be lost, how-
ever, when conclusions are deployed to support a given proposal or perspec-
tive, and particularly so when debates are politically fraught.118 James Boyd 
White has noted the simplicity of assuming that social science can “pass a plate 
with the truth on it over to the law.”119 
[T]he world created by [social science] is not monolithic but full of variety and
tension, not so much a set of established propositions as a set of questions and
methods. The results of such work are normally not “findings” in any simple
112  Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory 
and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 339 (2006). See also supra text accom-
panying notes 84–89. 
113  Mertz, supra note 80, at 20. 
114  A famous example is Charles Lawrence’s “cultural meaning test” which he developed to 
uncover “unconscious racism.” Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328 (1987). By employing 
psychology to uncover hidden biases, the article’s approach is very much in the realist mold. 
115  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 681–89 (2008). 
116  For a nuanced discussion of these challenges, see Elizabeth Mertz & Katherine Barnes, 
Combining Methods for a New Synthesis in Law and Empirical Research, in 1 THE NEW
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 17, at 180–81. 
117  DELBERT C. MILLER & NEIL J. SALKIND, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND SOCIAL
MEASUREMENT 14 (Delbert C. Miller & Neil J. Salkind eds., 6th ed. 2002) (describing 
recognition of the “[s]hortcomings of current research and possible solutions” as a formal 
element of research design). 
118  A fundamental psychological tendency in this regard is “confirmation bias”—the process 
of viewing the world as confirming pre-existing views and discounting evidence that contra-
dicts those views. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
119  JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL 
CRITICISM 13 (1990). 
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sense but tentative conclusions in a series of tentative conclusions, elaborated 
topics for argument and discussion . . . .120 
 Finally, “scientific” truths of the past have been shown to reflect and justi-
fy ideas that, we know now, were horrifyingly wrong. A famous example is the 
extensive pseudo-science of racial differences.121 Perhaps ironically, Holmes 
himself offers another example by enthusiastically embracing the scientific le-
gitimacy of eugenics in his infamous opinion Buck v. Bell.122 
Efforts, then, to establish an affirmative program to redress the realist cri-
tique have either failed or, at best, have not fully succeeded.123 Mediation offers 
a fresh way to consider this challenge, and it is to mediation that this Article 
now turns. 
II. MEDIATION
While the roots of mediation have a long history,124 mediation has experi-
enced massive growth in the last forty years.125 Mediation is practiced in an ex-
traordinarily wide variety of disputes: divorce,126 commercial disputes,127 com-
munity disputes,128 environmental disputes,129 conflicts between or among 
120  Id. 
121  See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 52 (1996) (tracing the use of “scien-
tific” evidence to demonstrate innate differences among “races”). 
122  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (declaring that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles 
are enough.”). 
123  See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 14, at 165 (characterizing the realist “affirma-
tive program” as “desultory” and “less insightful” than their critique). 
124  For an interdisciplinary history of mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and 
Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 
(2000). For a discussion of mediation that stretches back centuries, see Valerie A. Sanchez, 
Towards a History of ADR: The Dispute Processing Continuum in Anglo-Saxon England 
and Today, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1996). 
125  Art Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 163, 167 (2016) 
(“[m]ediation has seen tremendous growth over the last thirty years, moving from an uncon-
ventional means of conflict resolution to a common step in the traditional litigation pro-
cess.”). 
126  DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 4 (Jay Fol-
berg et al. eds., 2004). 
127  See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 
xiii (1996) (detailing the uses of ADR and mediation for conflicts within organizations). 
128  See THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993); Sara Cobb & Janet 
Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The Construction and Transformation of Narra-
tives in Community Mediation, 11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 69, 71 (1991). 
129  Elaine Smith, Danger-Inequality of Resources Present: Can the Environmental Media-
tion Process Provide an Effective Answer?, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 379, 379–81; Lawrence 
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1981). 
Fall 2017] REALIZING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17 
students at schools,130 criminal matters (usually called “victim-offender media-
tion”),131 international disputes,132 and virtually any type of controversy, even 
those that could not or would be unlikely to be the subject of litigation.133  
 The following examines several aspects of mediation that are of particular 
relevance to this Article. 
A. Mediation and “ADR”
Mediation is one of the processes, along with arbitration and settlement, of-
ten grouped as “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” or ADR. Many proponents of 
mediation embrace the acronym, but not what the initials stand for. In their 
view, ADR should really stand for “Appropriate Dispute Resolution.”134 This 
seemingly minor change represents an important idea: litigation is not the pri-
mary means of dispute resolution but rather one of many alternatives. This is 
sometimes referred to as “fitting the forum to the fuss.”135 Litigation is appro-
priate for some “fusses”: mediation is for others.136 
130  William S. Haft & Elaine R. Weiss, Peer Mediation in Schools: Expectations and Evalu-
ations, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213, 213–15 (1998); Kelly Rozmus, Peer Mediation Pro-
grams in Schools: Resolving Classroom Conflict but Raising Ethical Concerns?, 26 J.L. &
EDUC. 69, 69–71 (1997). 
131  Mark William Bakker, Comment, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: 
Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (1994); Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 
43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1248 (1994). 
132  Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International Arbitration and 
Commercial Mediation, 75 TUL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2001). 
133  For a review of the preceding and other applications of mediation, see KIMBERLEE K.
KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 339–57 (3d ed. 2004). 
134  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multi-
cultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 37 (1996) (preferring “appropriate dispute reso-
lution” to “alternative dispute resolution”). 
135  Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, NEGOT. J., Jan. 1994, at 49, 67. Some courts 
have implemented this idea by establishing “multi-door courthouses.” The idea is that that 
litigants may enter different “doors,” each of which represent different dispute resolution 
processes. See Larry Ray & Anne L. Clare, The Multi-Door Courthouse Idea: Building the 
Courthouse of the Future . . . Today, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 7, 9 (1985). 
136  Some commentators have argued that counseling clients about ADR should be mandato-
ry. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., ADR, the ABA, and Client Control: A Proposal that the 
Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183, 
187–88 (1999). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct have moved in this direction. 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 2.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“when a matter 
is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary . . . to inform the client of forms of dispute 
resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.”). Some go further and 
hold that a failure to do so is legal malpractice. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation 
and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the 
Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 819, 823–24 (1990). 
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B. How Is Mediation Defined?
There is no consensus about how mediators should mediate or even what
mediation is.137 This is not due to lack of effort. One effort is as follows: 
[M]ediation is . . . the intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable
third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power, who as-
sists the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement of
the issues in dispute.138
Another definition is that mediation is a “process where the third party neu-
tral, whether one person or more, acts as a facilitator to assist in resolving a 
dispute between two or more parties.”139 State statutes offer variations on these 
themes.140 
One commonality among these efforts is that the mediator’s role is not as a 
decision-maker. Rather, a mediator “assists” the parties, although what such 
“assistance” means tends to be vague. It might range from actively encouraging 
parties to settle a matter to doing nothing except sit as participants speak to one 
another. This vagueness is largely inevitable because there is little consensus 
about the proper way to conduct mediation.141 
This lack of consensus is usually analyzed through three widely recognized 
models of mediation: evaluative mediation, facilitative mediation, and trans-
formative mediation.142 While all three have adherents, evaluative mediation 
tends to be the outlier at least in the mediation literature: full-fledged defenses 
of an evaluative approach as the right approach are rare.143 As its name sug-
137  Lorig Charkoudian et al., Mediation by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet—or 
Would It? The Struggle to Define Mediation and Its Various Approaches, 26 CONFLICT RES.
Q. 293, 313 (2009) (noting that “there is no accepted agreement as to the definition of me-
diation . . . .”).
138  CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 15 (3d ed. 2003). 
139  KOVACH, supra note 133, at 14. 
140  Virginia is a representative example: Mediation is “a process in which a neutral facili-
tates communication between the parties and, without deciding the issues or imposing a solu-
tion on the parties, enables them to understand and to reach a mutually agreeable resolution 
to their dispute.” VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-576.4 (West 2017). 
141  Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 
309, 314 (2000); Kenneth M. Roberts, Mediating the Evaluative-Facilitative Debate: Why 
Both Parties Are Wrong and a Proposal for Settlement, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 187, 187 
(2007). 
142  The classic article that establishes different approaches is Leonard L. Riskin, Under-
standing Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). Riskin’s article was published prior to the rise of “trans-
formative mediation,” but that form of mediation has joined evaluative and facilitative medi-
ation as “the big three” models of mediation. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Evaluative Mediation: 
In Search of Practice Competencies, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 193, 194 (2009). 
143  Even an important defense of evaluative mediation notes that “[d]ifferent approaches to 
mediation practice have merit.” L. Randolph Lowry, Evaluative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND
FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 126, at 73. De-
fenses of other forms of mediation are usually not so measured. See generally Lela P. Love, 
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gests, evaluative mediators evaluate the legal merits of a dispute,144 and many 
argue that this represents litigation under the guise of mediation—a kind of 
false advertising.145 In contrast, facilitative and transformative mediation have 
little in common with litigation: they proceed from fundamentally different 
premises, and these distinct premises have particular importance in analyzing 
the relationship between mediation and litigation.146 This Article will thus focus 
on these two models. 
Facilitative mediators believe that participants are experts on their own 
lives, and thus best equipped to define and resolve their own conflicts.147 Such 
mediators seek to “shift attention from retrospective positions and accounts to 
prospective stories, effectively disconnecting the problem from its history, from 
its roots.”148 Facilitative mediators rarely (or, depending on the mediator, ever) 
evaluate legal positions or present themselves as having particular authority or 
expertise to do so.149  
Transformative mediators defer to the participants not only as to how to 
conduct the mediation, but even as to what the goals of the mediation are. Rob-
ert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph A. Folger, the founders of transformative medi-
ation,150 describe their conception of transformative mediation as follows: 
[M]ediation [has] a unique potential for . . . changing the mindset of people who
are involved in the process . . . [P]arties are helped to transform their conflict in-
The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 
(1997). 
144  Lowry, supra note 143, at 72. 
145  Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns about the Nature and 
Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 269 (2001) (“it is 
common for evaluative mediators to be lawyers or retired judges with considerable substan-
tive legal expertise”). 
146  See Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of Dis-
pute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 871–72 (2004). 
147  Leonard Riskin, for example, notes that a facilitative mediator “assumes that the parties 
are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their situa-
tions better than the mediator and, perhaps, better than their lawyers . . . [T]he facilitative 
mediator assumes that his principal mission is to clarify and to enhance communication be-
tween the parties in order to help them decide what to do.” Riskin, supra note 142, at 24. 
148  Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 128, at 71. This, however, is not an absolute rule: many facili-
tative mediators acknowledge that exploration of the past, and the corresponding catharsis 
that might arise from that exploration, can be an integral part of mediation. See, e.g., 
KOVACH, supra note 133, at 48–49; MOORE, supra note 138, at 162–69. 
149  The question regarding whether to assess parties’ choices about settlement is complicated 
and mediators—including self-identified facilitative mediators—differ on the question. For a 
discussion of the issue, see Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Me-
diation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 720–55 (1997), proposing 
“norm-generating,” “norm-educating,” and “norm-advocating” as mediators’ choices about 
assessing settlement options. 
150  The definitive discussion of transformative mediation is ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO
CONFLICT 258 (rev. ed. 2005). 
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teraction—from destructive to constructive—and to experience the personal ef-
fects of such transformation.151 
In performing their role, mediators adhere to one primary mandate: “follow the 
parties wherever they may decide to go next.”152 
Both facilitative and transformative mediation reject law as the sole means 
to resolve conflict. Lon Fuller, in a classic statement about the nature of media-
tion,153 said that mediation liberates parties “from the encumbrance of rules” 
and “accept[s], instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust[,] and under-
standing that will enable them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of 
formal prescriptions laid down in advance.”154 Liberated from such “encum-
brances,” mediation has a “capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, 
not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and 
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their atti-
tudes and dispositions toward one another.”155 Although law can and does 
sometimes play a role in mediation even in facilitative or transformative media-
tion,156 law is not the primary basis or, in some cases, a basis at all for resolving 
conflict.157 
Mediation is also fundamentally different from litigation procedurally. 
With the exception of legal and contractual confidentiality protections,158 medi-
ation has little formal “process.” While there are norms and conventions about 
how to practice mediation,159 these are more in the way of “best practices” (at 
least in the view of some) that are not formalized and are certainly not enforce-
able. 
151  Id. at 22–23. 
152  Id. at 184. 
153  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 124, at 15–16. 
154  Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325–26 
(1971). 
155  Id. 
156  Sometimes this idea is expressed as the presence of the “shadow of the law”—a phrase 
that originates from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968, 997 (1979). Unsurprisingly, the pres-
ence of lawyers enhances the possibility that law plays an important role in mediation. Craig 
A. McEwan, et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensur-
ing Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1376, 1391–92 (1995).
157  This is a crucial distinction between facilitative and transformative mediation as opposed 
to evaluative mediation. Most facilitative and all transformative mediators do not recognize 
law as controlling or even relevant unless the parties deem it so, while evaluative meeting 
does the opposite. See supra text accompanying notes 142–157. Indeed, there is an accepted 
practice in facilitative mediation to avoid framing conflict in litigation terms—such as 
“complaint,” “answer,” “position,” “custody and visitation”—as a means to move parties 
away from the litigation narrative. See, e.g., Rubinson, supra note 146, at 871–72. 
158  Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for 
Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37–45 (1986). 
159  A good example is a “private session or caucus” in which the mediator meets with each 
mediation participant privately and confidentially. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 161 (3d ed. 2004). 
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A good example of the lack of formal process in mediation relates to the 
concept of “evidence.” A core principle underlying litigation is that facts must 
be “relevant.”160 Relevance is defined as whether “the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”161 A judge decides what is relevant, and thereby what 
is admissible or not. Holmes offers a vivid illustration. Litigation “retain[s] on-
ly the facts of legal import,” and thus “a lawyer does not mention that his client 
wore a white hat when he made a contract” even if his client wants him to do 
so.162  
Mediation has no such limitations. The mediator has no power to exclude 
“evidence” on any basis, let alone relevance.163 Perhaps discussing the white 
hat is, for some reason, important to one or both parties. There is no “rule” to 
“exclude” it.164 Moreover, an exchange of perspective[s]—hardly the stuff of 
admissible facts in litigation—might be crucial.165 Anything could be “rele-
vant” in mediation if the participants deem it so.166 
Another important dimension of mediation is that it is forward-looking.167 
This aspect of mediation enables participants to craft solutions that will fulfill 
their interests in the future.168 This upends the litigation norm, which primarily 
focuses on “findings of fact”—a historical reconstruction that is required to as-
sess what remedy or penalty, if any, is appropriate.169 
160  See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(1) (“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 
needs of the case . . . .”). 
161  FED. R. EVID. 401(b). 
162  Holmes, supra note 20, at 458. 
163  JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING
CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1984) (noting that participants in mediation can discuss 
“whatever . . . they deem relevant regardless of rules of evidence . . . .”); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to Future in Pursuing Jus-
tice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 114 (2004) (mediation offers “open 
dialogue unrestricted by rigid rules of evidence . . . .”). 
164  Even putting the issue in terms of “exclusion” misconstrues mediation because the medi-
ator does not issue “orders.” Menkel-Meadow, supra note 163, at 113. 
165  KOVACH, supra note 133, at 140 (mediation enables parties to “begin to acknowledge 
another view of the situation”); Alan C. Tidwell, Not Effective Communication but Effective 
Persuasion, 12 MEDIATION Q. 3, 5 (1994) (“[t]he challenge for mediation is to somehow lead 
people to a situation where they can, at the very least, allow two contending perspectives to 
coexist”). 
166  FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 163, at 10 (mediation involves “a comprehensive mix 
of” [participants’] “needs, interests, and whatever else” they choose to discuss). 
167  Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 128, at 71 (mediation focuses “not in the past but in the pre-
sent and the future”). 
168  Jana B. Singer, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close 
Connection between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Dis-
putes, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 181 (mediation is “future-oriented--designed to shift 
attention away from past acts and grievances and toward the future-oriented predictions”). 
169  There are seeming exceptions, such as calculating future damages in civil cases, but these 
efforts remain contingent on whether prior events warrant engaging in the calculation at all. 
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 In the end, then, mediation fundamentally diverges from adjudication in 
form and substance. 
III. MEDIATION AS REALISM
Mediation is, in many respects, realism in action. This Section describes 
how and why. 
A. F.S.C. Northrop and Realism and Mediation 
There has been little consideration of the connections between mediation 
and realism. A rare exception is Carrie Menkel-Meadow—a central figure in 
mediation scholarship—who has identified this connection, albeit without un-
dertaking a sustained analysis of it.170 Another example is Lon L. Fuller, who, 
as discussed above, described mediation in non-formalist terms although he did 
not explicitly cite realism in doing so.171 A few others have made the connec-
tions implicitly, although, again, with no focused analysis.172 
 An exception is a little-known article entitled The Mediational Approval 
Theory of Law in American Legal Realism written by F.S.C. Northrop in 
1958.173 Northrop, a philosopher by trade,174 began his teaching at Yale Univer-
sity during the heyday of original realism, although he has not been identified 
170  Consider the following: “I have often thought of interest-based negotiation and mediation 
as a legacy of legal realism. They are adaptive expressions of the interaction of the ‘law on 
the books’ with the needs and interests of real people conducting transactions or having dis-
putes.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Demo-
cratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2677 n.69 (1995). For oth-
er examples, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New 
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX.
L. REV. 407, 416 (1997) (“formalism spawned realism, the rigidity of rules and the ‘limited
remedial imagination of courts,’ [and] “gave (re)birth to the more flexible and hybrid forms
of mediation . . . .”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution
and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 7, 12 (2004) (the “focus on ‘disputing processes’ de-centers—but does not
eliminate—law as the primary variable explaining how disputes are resolved . . . was a natu-
ral derivative of the school of legal realism . . . .”).
171  Fuller, supra note 154. 
172  See Michael Albertstein, The Jurisprudence of Mediation Between Formalism, Feminism 
and Identity Conversations, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 19 (2009) (referring to “me-
diation as a practical discourse, which offers an alternative to mainstream jurisprudential 
thinking.”). 
173  F. S. C. Northrop, The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism, 
44 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (1958). It appears that the article has only been cited 19 times in the 
60 years since its publication, and in 18 of these 19 times the article is listed in a footnote 
without further comment. The one exception is in a single, non-substantive sentence in a 
book review from 1966. Jerome Alan Cohen, Book Review, 80 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 
(1966). 
174  KALMAN, supra note 25, at 149. Northrop was particularly interested in comparing east-
ern and western philosophy. See F.S.C. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST: AN 
INQUIRY CONCERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING (3d prtg. 1964). 
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as a realist.175 He appears, apart from Mediational Approval article, to have had 
no other connection to mediation. The timing of the article is unusual: it was 
written after the flowering of realism yet before the full emergence of both new 
legal realism and mediation. Nevertheless, his article represents the primary—if 
not only—sustained effort to examine interconnections between mediation and 
realism. 
 Northrop identifies two ways to “arrive at a theory of law.”176 One is 
through “codification”—essentially a type of formalism.177 The other is through 
what he calls “the mediational approval theory of law”—a process involving 
“recourse to . . . the disputants themselves.”178 This “approval theory” involves 
“bringing the considerations behind each party’s psychological judgment to the 
attention of the other party”179—something he vividly called “unique-for-me-
ness.”180 He associates this process as realist.181 
Northrop saw his two “theories of law” as appropriate for different types of 
dispute.  Codification is appropriate when issues of “social good” are at stake, 
such as those involving “all the people of the nation.”182 In contrast, mediation 
is for matters where individual needs are at issue.183 In such cases, “[b]y re-
stricting the criterion of justice to the local disputants, treating each case as par-
ticular and unique, justice is done to the diversity and relativity of the people’s 
approvals and disapprovals.”184 
Northrop was plainly not a “pure realist” in the mold of Jerome Frank or 
even Holmes: he did not deny the legitimacy of “codification” or view logic as 
judicial window-dressing.185 He did, however, view his “mediational theory”—
extra-legal conflict resolution by disputants focusing on their own needs and, 
more generally, on the “particular”186—as realist. Northrop thus develops an 
important insight. “Mediational theory” solves a basic limitation of formalism: 
it cannot take into account the specifics—the “particularity”—of disputes.  
175  Northrop does not appear in most discussions of realism except in passing. See KALMAN, 
supra note 25, at 149 (mentioning Northrop as a faculty member at Yale without further dis-
cussion). 
176  Northrop, supra note 173, at 348. 
177  Id. at 350. 
178  Id. at 348–49. 
179  Id. at 349. 
180  Id. at 356. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. at 363. 
183  Id. at 360. 
184  Id. at 351. 
185  For the view of Frank and Holmes on logic as illusory, see supra text accompanying 
notes 27–28, 48–52. 
186  Northrop, supra note 173, at 356. 
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B. The Mediation Solution
 Northrop’s prescient work is a good jumping off point to examine what
happens when the realist critique is viewed through the profoundly different 
perspective of mediation. 
1. Judgeless Dispute Resolution
As discussed above, realists repeatedly asserted that judges inhabit a place 
defined by distinct views and life experiences.187 A judge assembles legal au-
thority to support a decision already arrived at.188 “Political, economic, and 
moral prejudices”189—what Holmes called “inarticulate and unconscious judg-
ment”190—are difficult if not impossible to eradicate. New legal realism and re-
lated movements similarly recognize this challenge.191 
 Mediation provides a remarkably simple answer to this seemingly intracta-
ble problem. Instead of grappling with how judges can or should reach deci-
sions, mediation moves the locus of decision-making from judges to the partic-
ipants themselves. This is not to say that psychological perceptions are 
eliminated: cognitive shortcuts—called “heuristics”—influence everyone’s 
thinking, including participants.192 Nevertheless, parties know infinitely more 
about themselves than anyone else ever could, including judges. 
2. Individualizing Justice
According to the realists, formalism’s “dry and abstract logic”193 leads to 
“dehumanized justice.”194 In its place, realists called for the “individualization 
of law”195 through a focus on social reality and particularity.196 New Legal real-
ists take this insight further: their work tends to be more contextual rather than 
linear and seeks to incorporate “law” into “extralegal factors” in light of a 
complex set of interactions involving “legal actors” and “institutional norms 
and pressures.”197  
187  See supra text accompanying notes 170–88. 
188  See supra text accompanying notes 27–28, 39–42. 
189  FRANK, supra note 23, at 117. 
190  Holmes, supra note 20, at 465. 
191  See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 114, at 321 (noting how “racism infects almost everyone” 
and “is influenced by unconscious racial motivation”). 
192  For two leading books on the subject, see RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN 
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (James J. Jenkins et al. 
eds., 1980); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et. 
al. eds., 1982). 
193  FRANK, supra note 23, at 192. 
194  Id. at 191. 
195  Id. at 183. 
196  Mensch, supra note 39, at 33–35. 
197  Michael McCann, Preface, in 1 THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, supra note 17, at xv. 
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Mediation meets this challenge in a different way. It is purely individual-
ized because individuals control the process.198 By eschewing formalist “pre-
scriptions laid down in advance,”199 mediation focuses on the centrality of the 
extra-legal—the “human world.”200 Mediation is thus the opposite of “dry and 
abstract”: it is concrete, particular, and specific, and thereby realist. 
3. Particularizing Remedies
Another aspect of “dehumanizing justice”—albeit one that the realists only 
hinted at—relates to how courts award money damages and little else.201 Mon-
ey serves as a proxy for all damages. It is, however, a poor, if not irrelevant, 
proxy at best for many litigants. One study about medical malpractice found 
that money was the primary aim of only 18 percent of claimants.202 In contrast, 
over 50 percent saw their aims as non-monetary, such as admission of fault and 
prevention of future errors.203 The analysis of these results has a distinct realist 
cast: Lay disputants want disparate things than what the justice system can de-
liver. What they desire is inherently different from the paradigm of legal dis-
course and decision-making that attorneys and judges are “socialized into in 
law school,” which dominates discussions by legal actors.204 
In contrast, the individualized process of mediation extends to individual-
ized remedies as well. Participants can resolve issues through any number of 
means that take into account the specifics of a dispute and the disputants them-
selves.205 These might include apologies, new business arrangements, specify-
ing future conduct, and whatever else participants choose to include.206 Trans-
formative mediation goes further and eliminates even a residue of formalism, 
with its goal of transforming mindsets and social interactions without driving 
towards “settlement.”207  
198  FRANK, supra note 23. 
199  Fuller, supra note 154, at 326. 
200  TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS,
PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 17 (2009). 
201  Id. at 42–43.  
202  Id. at 43. 
203  Id. at 42–43. The study also found that the listing of claimants’ goals was not driven by 
cultural disapproval of identifying money as a goal. 
204  Id. See also Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science 
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 894 (1997). 
205  Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017, 
1021 (2004) (“[m]any ‘equitable’ and other non-economic remedies are given a voice in me-
diation that has been lost in the civil justice system.”). 
206  Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L.
REV. S5, S6 (1989); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of 
the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829 (2003); Rennard Strickland, 
Legal Education in the Twenty-First Century, 80 OR. L. REV. 1449, 1456 (2001); See supra 
text accompanying notes 165–68. 
207  BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 150, at 217. 
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4. It’s Complicated
 A strain of realism sees formalism as a mechanism for simplification.208 
This is perhaps ironic, given that conventionally it is formalistic legal analy-
sis—the “thinking like a lawyer”—that appears arcane and thereby requires at-
tendance at law school to master.209 
Mediation, once again, makes a sharp shift from adjudication’s view of ex-
pertise. In true realist fashion, mediation jettisons the simplicity of formalism 
for the complications of real life. In mediation, however, it is not judges who 
are tasked with understanding this complexity. Rather, it is the participants who 
are “experts”: they and they alone inhabit their own world, with all of its histo-
ry, experience, and understandings. Such a world is unknowable to anyone but 
participants themselves.210 The realist challenge of how to encourage judges to 
recognize and grapple with the complexity of reality is thus met because media-
tion employs experts whose expertise is beyond reproach: the parties them-
selves. 
5. The Man Behind the Curtain
 The realist critique raises another knotty question: To what extent should 
the public know that uncertainty and unconscious judgment are the real bases 
for decision-making? The question is a difficult one. On the one hand, Holmes 
and his successors argued repeatedly and strenuously the importance of judges 
recognizing the real, non-logical basis for their decisions.211 On the other hand, 
doing so too transparently risks compromising the legitimacy of law before the 
public—what Frank characterized as whether there is “value” in “lay igno-
rance.”212 The issue then is whether maintaining the illusion of certainty before 
the public is a helpful fiction because it preserves confidence in law. Not many 
realists apart from Frank confronted the issue, perhaps because any answer is 
so troubling. 
 With mediation, however, the question is not worth asking. It is not the 
courts that make decisions, so there is nothing to be transparent about. Individ-
uals have legitimacy in reaching their own agreements about their own con-
flicts. Indeed, mediation empowers participants, thereby rendering the legiti-
macy of courts a moot point. 
208  FRANK, supra note 23, at 245–46 (alluding to legal “over-simplification”). 
209  Frank, supra note 36, at 913 (arguing that “[t]he trouble with much law school teaching 
is that, confining its attention to a study of upper court opinions, it is hopelessly simplified”). 
210  See supra text accompanying notes 149–51. 
211  See supra text accompanying notes 28, 48–52. 
212  See FRANK, supra note 23, at 245 (discussing the argument that “[t]he laity must not peer 
behind the scenes” at how decisions are actually reached). 
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6. The “Certainty” Critique
Realists repeatedly decried the delusion of judges who believe that rules, 
when rightly applied, lead to results that are correct.213 In Holmes’s terms, cer-
tainty is an illusion, and judges do neither themselves nor anyone else any fa-
vors by pretending that it is not.214 
Mediation accepts the realist critique of certainty and draws upon it as a 
means to demonstrate its own value. This is done through a concept called the 
“best alternative to a negotiated agreement”—usually known by its acronym 
“BATNA.”215 A BATNA is the best option available should the parties fail to 
reach a negotiated agreement.216 The best option in such a situation would typi-
cally be litigation. This does not mean achieving hoped-for results in litigation, 
such as “winning” or being found “not guilty.” Rather, it is pursuing litigation 
and everything that accompanies itit delays, expense, and, most importantly for 
purposes of this Article, uncertainty driven by whatever invisible factors moti-
vate a judgt to reach a particular decision. While no one will know how a medi-
ation will unfold or whether it will succeed, a result reached by the parties 
themselves is, by definition, certain.217 
 Thus, the idea of BATNA accepts the realist notion that the results of liti-
gation are uncertain. However, by offering certainty through mediated agree-
ments, it transforms the realist challenge into a way to conceptualize the bene-
fits of the mediation alternative.  
7. The Interdisciplinary Impulse
 Realists have long looked to other disciplines as a means to enrich their cri-
tique.218 “New legal realists” also see empiricism as integral to their work.219 
213  See supra text accompanying notes 28, 39–42. 
214  FRANK, supra note 23, at 94. Frank’s uncertainty critique extended to jury decisions as 
well. Id. at 186 (jury verdicts characterized by “utter unpredictability”). 
215  Roger Fisher and William Ury first developed this idea in ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011). 
216  Id. at 104. 
217  Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rule-
making, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 153 (1985) (noting how the “uncertainty” of assessing 
BATNA is an incentive for settlement); Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 663, 705–06 (2001) (BATNA includes personal/commercial uncertainty in liti-
gation); Scott R. Peppet, Updating Our Understanding of the Role of Lawyers: Lessons from 
MasterCard, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 186 (2007) (noting “advice from negotiation 
and alternative dispute resolution scholars urging parties to settle earlier by reducing uncer-
tainty”). The uncertainty of BATNA has also arisen in a variety of specialized mediation 
contexts. Janet C. Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps 
Fish and Farmers Happy—For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 318 (1996) (“the uncertain-
ty associated with how a court might resolve . . . rights . . . left the parties somewhat unsure 
of their BATNAs and gave impetus to the desire for a negotiated solution.”). 
218  Cohen, supra note 32, at 841–42. 
219  See Suchman & Mertz, supra note 82. 
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Indeed, many have drawn upon both qualitative and quantitative studies to il-
luminate their perspectives and pursue their goals.220 
 The relationship between mediation and other disciplines is different, and 
for a simple reason: mediation is itself composed of different disciplines. Psy-
chology, anthropology, sociology, and law have all played a role in the origins, 
development, and practice of mediation.221 Leading mediation journals arise 
from both the world of law and from social science.222 Mediators themselves 
are from different professions, especially law and mental health practitioners.223 
Unlike realists, then, there is no need to issue a call for mediation to be more 
interdisciplinary. It is already.  
IV. LIMITATIONS: INCOME INEQUALITY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
This Article has thus far examined how mediation represents realism in ac-
tion, and how, as a result, it meets challenges of the realist critique. Mediation 
does not provide all of the answers, however.224 Perhaps the preeminent ques-
tion it does not answer relates to social inequality. This section provides an 
overview of the twin struggles of realism and mediation to come to grips with 
and gain traction in solving the intersection of poverty and dispute resolution. 
A. Social Justice and Realism
The experience of those in poverty with the judicial system—often referred
to as “access to justice”—has little or nothing in common with how law school 
teaches civil and criminal procedure.225 The ways in which the judicial system 
is stacked against low-income litigants are too numerous to mention and are 
beyond the scope of this Article. They manifest at the level of individual adju-
dication226 and in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.227 One core aspect of 
220  Id. at 563. 
221  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 170, at 12. 
222  222  See supra text accompanying note 7. 
223   Elizabeth E. Bader, The Psychology and Neurobiology of Mediation, 17 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 363 (2016); David C. Hesser & Elizabeth Jarrell Craig, Team Mediation: 
An Interdisciplinary Model Balancing Mediation in the “Matrix”, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
113, 116 (2007) (“Mediators are generally either attorneys or mental health professionals.”). 
How psychology is embedded in mediation remains a particularly lively topic. Id. at 124 
(addressing “the infusion of mental health professionals into the mediation process”); Daniel 
A. Hoffman & Richard N. Wolman, The Psychology of Mediation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 759 (2013) (exploring the application of “psychological phenomena” to mediation).
224  Some mediation proponents approach hyperbole in their advocacy of mediation. See, 
e.g., Love, supra note 143, at 945 (mediation enables humans to “continue to survive and
evolve as a species”). BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 150, at 258 (mediation is “an essential
positive force in constituting human identity and shared meaning”).
225  The literature on the issue is voluminous. For an excellent overview, see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
226  The most famous treatment of this issue, and one that has been and continues to be influ-
ential, is Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
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the subordination of low-income litigants plays out when they face adversaries 
who command substantial economic resources. Examples include a tenant fac-
ing a landlord,228 a debtor facing a creditor,229 a homeowner facing a lender,230 
or, more generally, a pro se litigant facing a party represented by counsel.231 
Courts of “mass justice” fail to offer resources that can vindicate the procedural 
and substantive rights of those in poverty in such situations.232 In the criminal 
arena, this leads to defendants being coerced into accepting pleas without a 
meaningful right to trial by jury.233 
To a certain extent, realism does appear to, or at least should, address is-
sues of poverty given its “on the ground” focus.234 Nevertheless, realism tends 
to examine adjudication—its uncertainty and illusions—by describing cases 
free of specific characteristics, such as generic cases of breach of contract.235 
The impact of the legal system on those in poverty was thus rarely, if ever, ad-
dressed in the work of the original realists. 
More recent iterations of realism do address poverty head on, although not 
always in explicitly realist terms. There is a large literature on problems of ac-
cess to justice, particularly courts of mass justice in which an overwhelming 
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). A dimension of Galanter’s critique is that the 
structure of the legal system is such that “there are . . . more rights and rules ‘on the books’ 
than can be vindicated or enforced.” Id. at 122. 
227  Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to 
Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389. 
228  Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the Halls, in 1 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 11, 119–21 (Richard L Abel ed., 1982); Carroll Seron et. al., 
The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing 
Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 421 (2001). 
229  Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt 
Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2014). 
230  Many scholars have examined how “power differentials” can render mediation inappro-
priate or dangerous. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Jus-
tice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 15–16 (noting that power differentials have the “potential for party coer-
cion”). 
231  Michael M. Pettersen et al., Representation Disparities and Impartiality: An Empirical 
Analysis of Party Perception of Fear, Preparation, and Satisfaction in Divorce Mediation 
When Only One Party Has Counsel, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 663 (2010); Richard W. Painter, Pro 
Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.
Q. 45, 47 (2011).
232  See Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89 (2005) (de-
scribing how available judicial resources produce courts of mass justice, which fail to pre-
serve the rights of low-income litigants). 
233  Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1343 (2012) (referring to 
criminal proceedings as “meet ‘em, plead ‘em,” “cattle herding,” and “McJustice”); Michael 
M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008)
(“ninety-five percent of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea”).
234  See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
235  An example is Karl Llewellyn’s illustration of the uncertainty of judicial trial-level deci-
sions quoted at supra note 16, at 1231–32. 
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number of pro se parties litigate.236 Some that draw upon elements of realism, 
particularly the law and society movement, also explore this territory.237 Other 
critical theories, such as Critical Race Theory and Feminist Jurisprudence, at 
times address poverty through their exploration of how law oppresses disem-
powered groups.238  
This literature has gone a long way to illuminate the ways law facilitates 
and instantiates the marginalization of the poor. In the end, though, these issues 
remain intractable, hence the continued vitality of work that seeks to ameliorate 
them. 
B. Mediation and Social Justice
Mediation literature suffers from similar shortcomings, particularly issues
arising in “court-annexed” mediation in which most low-income mediate. All 
fifty states have some form of court-annexed mediation.239 The professed goals 
of these programs are often admirable, particularly promotion of self-
determination for litigants and speedy adjudication of claims.240 Not all inten-
tions, however, are so party-centered: a core goal, whether stated explicitly or 
not, is to manage overwhelmed dockets in light of resource limitations.241 This 
sometimes leads to quick-fire mediation, with little or no time to engage in the 
236  Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the 
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1999). 
237  See generally Frank Munger, Immanence and Identity: Understanding Poverty through 
Law and Society Research, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 931(1998). 
238  An influential example is Charles Lawrence’s proposal for a “cultural meaning test” as a 
means to uncover “unconscious racism,” thereby enabling plaintiffs to prove a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause without a showing of specific intent. Lawrence, supra note 114, 
at 355–56. For a discussion of the impact of the feminist critique on law, see The Feminist 
Pervasion: How Gender-Based Scholarship Informs Law and Law Teaching, 15 REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 3 (2005). This literature has been criticized as ignoring socioeconomic sta-
tus as a category that cuts across other social categories. See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperreg-
ulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014); 
Beth Caldwell, Addressing Intersectionality in the Lives of Women in Poverty: Incorporating 
Core Components of a Social Work Program into Legal Education, 20 J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 823 (2012). 
239  See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (1998); Court 
ADR Across the U.S., RSI’S COURT ADR RESOURCE CENTER, http://courtadr.org/court-adr-
across-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/24CP-36CR] (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); see also Deborah 
R. Hensler, Our Court, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-
Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2003).
240  See Hensler, supra note 239, at 185. 
241  See Will Pryor, What’s Wrong with Mediation These Days, and How Can We Fix It?, 32 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 69, 71 (2014) (courts can “become addicted to media-
tion referral as a means of docket control”); How to Prevent Mediation from Running 
Aground—Also: Busting Myths About What Arbitrators Do, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 3, 7 (2005) (quoting a senior settlement attorney as saying that “court mediation pro-
grams exist for docket control purposes”); Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time 
of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 993, 1005 (2012). 
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open process that is a defining characteristic of mediation.242 Moreover, most of 
these litigants do not have the means to retain counsel, thus creating further risk 
when they mediate.243  
In addition, power differentials are a core concern for many mediators. 
Such differentials in terms of socioeconomic status is a particular  issue,244 al-
though other situations also bring power differentials into play, such as ethnici-
ty245 and gender246 and when one participant is a victim of domestic violence.247 
The presence of power differentials subvert self-determination and autono-
my.248 Autonomy assumes both parties are able to work together, and without 
an even playing field, one party can coerce, or at least influence, a particular 
result.249 Autonomy thus becomes grand in the abstract but troubling in prac-
tice. 
Perhaps ironically, one answer is to this problem is to stress the virtues of a 
traditional adjudicative process. One of the strengths of mediation—its flexibil-
242  Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the 
End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 378 (2009) (quoting a court-
connected mediator that judicial “expectations” are to deliver settlements in a “fraction of 
the time required to effectively do so”). 
243  Trina Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for Legal Ser-
vices Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 186 (2003). Virginia, for example, 
requires that all mediators communicate that “[e]ach party . . . has the opportunity to consult 
with independent legal counsel at any time and is encouraged to do so.” VA CODE. ANN.
§ 8.01-576.12 (West 2002). Despite sounding reasonable, the advice is a sham if a party
cannot retain counsel because they have no means to do so. For discussions about the value
of representation in mediation, see Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in
Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial
Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269 (1999); McEwan et al., supra note 156, at 1319.
244  See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’S Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securit-
ized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1938–41 (2013) (discussing issues facing 
pro se homeowners in foreclosure proceedings). 
245  Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1378–84. 
246  Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1557–58 (1991); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer’s 
Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177 (1994). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Por-
tia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 40–43 (1985) (arguing that mediation can be more suitable for “female 
needs” than litigation). 
247  Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Me-
diation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 147 
(2003). 
248  Id. at 175. Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of 
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992). 
249  Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 230, at 16 (“power differentials may mean that 
mediation is simply an inappropriate forum for some subset of cases in which the potential 
for party coercion dictates that individual rights cannot be adequately protected”); Richard 
Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1394–97 (1997) (discussing the difficulty participants may have in 
recognizing power differentials in mediation). 
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ity and lack of external constraints imposed by legal rules or court-imposed 
judgments—can also be its greatest weakness: some see the recourse to rights 
and rules in adjudication as a power equalizer.250 The realist vision of litigation, 
however, does not offer much assurance, given realism’s critique of adjudica-
tion as arbitrary and uncertain, with judges driven by subconscious, and often 
class-based, motives. Moreover, in light of the “on the ground” questions just 
addressed, litigation ignores how the process in courts of mass justice are pro-
foundly flawed and do not deliver on the promise of equal justice under the 
law.  
A weakness of both realism and mediation, then, is their inability to resolve 
a range of questions about how poverty subverts both mediation and adjudica-
tion.  
CONCLUSION 
Mediation offers a mode of dispute resolution that resonates and absorbs 
the realist critique and moves it in a positive direction. It operationalizes real-
ism, and it does so by engaging in an activity that, by definition, sets aside 
judging and the law. Instead of struggling to find ways for judges to embrace 
and build upon social particularity in doing their jobs, mediation moves social 
particularity to a place where it naturally resides: among litigants themselves. 
While mediation does not provide all the answers, particularly regarding pov-
erty and dispute resolution, mediation embodies what realism has hoped—and 
continues to hope—to achieve. 
In the end, then, mediation rejects what the realists rejected, and replaces it 
with a process that is very much in the realist mold. Oliver Wendell Holmes 
would be proud. 
250  See Grillo, supra note 246, at 1557–58; Delgado et al., supra note 245, at 1391–99; Fiss, 
supra note 7, at 1077 (arguing how a court-rendered judgment “lessen[s] the impact of dis-
tributional inequalities”). 
